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I.

The Bankruptcy Trustee’s Power of Turnover
A. The Trustee has a Broad Reach to Turnover Assets
Under section 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, “an entity, other than a custodian, in

possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease
. . . shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of such property . . .
.”4 Section 542(a) is limited in that turnover is not required when the property is of
inconsequential value or benefit to the estate, when the holder of the property has transferred it in
good faith without knowledge of the bankruptcy petition, or when the transfer of the property is
automatic to pay a life insurance premium.5 However, of these limitations, “none requires that
the debtor hold a possessory interest in the property at the commencement of the reorganization
proceedings.”6
The property that is subject to turnover is not defined in section 542, but it is commonly
understood to mean “property of the estate,” as defined in section 541.7 Section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code defines “property of the estate” as “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor
in property as of the commencement of the case,” with few exceptions.8 Further, §541(a)(6)
states that “proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits from services performed by Debtors
prior to the commencement of their bankruptcy case are property of the estate.”9 The Supreme
Court affirmed the expansive nature of § 541(a) in United States v. Whiting Pools: “[t]he House
and Senate Reports on the Bankruptcy Code indicate that §541(a)’s scope is broad” and
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11 U.S.C. § 542(a).
Id.
6
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 206 (1983).
7
See Brown v. Pyatt (In re Pyatt), 486 F.3d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 2007); Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454
F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2006); Affiliated Computer Sys. Inc. v. Sherman (In re Kemp), 52 F.3d 546, 550 (5th
Cir. 1995).
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11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
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See Anderson v. Win Realty, LLP (In re Anderson), No. AP 17-08040-JMM, 2018 WL 2179174, at *3 (Bankr. D.
Idaho May 10, 2018).
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additionally, many Bankruptcy Code provisions, such as §542(a), “bring into the estate property
in which the debtor did not have a possessory interest at the time the bankruptcy proceedings
commenced.”10 Due to the interaction of these provisions, when courts are faced with disputes
about turnover, they often must determine relevant property interests.11
B. The Role of State Property Law when Turnover is Contested
A debtor’s property interests are determined under state law.12 While Butner v. United
States confirmed this fact, it also acknowledged that the federal preemption doctrine still applies
in bankruptcy cases.13 If, for example, the Bankruptcy Code provides for a rule that addresses
the issue at hand directly, the Bankruptcy Code controls.14
II.

Circuits Courts Have Established Varying Standards When Trustees Press the
Limits of Their Authority
While courts must often rely on state law to determine property interests, ultimately,

“[w]hether property is included in the bankruptcy estate is a question of law.”15 Additionally,
Congress provided guidance on a general principle underlying § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code,
stating in its legislative history that § 541 was “not intended to expand the debtor’s rights against
others more than they exist at the commencement of the case.”16 Despite this, when facing

10

Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. at 205.
See e.g., In re Anderson at *3; Whiting Pools, Inc., at 210-11; Weinman v. Graves (In re Graves), 609 F.3d 1153,
1155 (10th Cir. 2010).
12
See In re Anderson at *3 (stating that “[s]tate law generally governs property interests within the context of a
bankruptcy case”).
13
See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (stating “[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state
law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed
differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding”).
14
See Shamus Holdings, LLC v. LBM Financial, LLC (In re Shamus Holdings, LLC), 642 F.3d 263, 267 (1st Cir.
2011) (asserting “when federal bankruptcy law supplies a rule that speaks directly to the right at issue, that rule
controls”).
15
See Parsons v. Union Planters Bank (In re Parsons), 280 F.3d 1185, 1188 (8th Cir. 2002).
16
See 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868.
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contested turnover, application of turnover standards by the circuit courts have been
inconsistent.17
In the Eighth Circuit, trustees can compel turnover of compensation that is earned prepetition and realized post-petition unless the debtor performs post-petition work that alters its
protectable interest.18 In In re Parsons, a trustee objected to exemptions claimed by a debtor
who argued that she was entitled to commissions paid post-petition because she rendered
services post-petition that were “indispensable” to the closing of the contracts.19 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed the trustee’s right to turnover of the commissions, allowing the debtor only an
exemption of 9.7% of the commissions for her post-petition work – an amount that the court
deemed equal to the wages she earned in post-petition work.20 The Eighth Circuit rejected the
debtor’s argument that the commissions were exempt under § 541(a)(6), reasoning that the
debtor’s post-petition work did not alter the existing contract terms and, therefore, also failed to
alter her protectable interest in the commissions.21
The Tenth Circuit will not compel turnover if doing so would grant the trustee a broader
interest in the property than the existing interest of the debtor.22 In In re Graves, the Tenth
Circuit stated that the trustee’s interest “must be limited to the same extent as the debtors’
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Compare Tidewater Finance v. Moffet (In re Moffett), 356 F.3d 518, 519–20 (4th Cir. 2004) (relying on
Virginia’s version of the UCC to determine that a secured creditor was subject to the turnover provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code and was compelled to turnover a repossessed vehicle), with Charles R. Hall Motors, Inc. v. Lewis
(In re Lewis), 137 F.3d 1280, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998) (disregarding Alabama’s version of the UCC and holding that
the “mere existence of the estate’s ability to redeem the automobile” was insufficient to render the secured creditor
subject to turnover provisions).
18
See In re Parsons, 280 F.3d at 1189.
19
Id. at 1187. The facts of this case are like those of In re Anderson, with a real estate agent debtor’s commissions at
stake in both. Here, as in In re Anderson, the debtor also had to pay a cut of her commission to the real estate group
she worked for, but the trustee here was less ambitious and did not even attempt to claim that part of the commission
as property of the estate. See In re Parsons, 280 F.3d at 1188; In re Anderson, No. AP 17-08040-JMM, 2018 WL
2179174, at *1 (Bankr. D. Idaho May 10, 2018)
20
Id. at 1189.
21
Id.
22
See In re Graves, 609 F.3d at 1155 (10th Cir. 2010).
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interest.”23 In In re Graves, the debtors elected, pre-petition, to irrevocably apply their federal
tax refund to their tax liability the following year.24 The bankruptcy trustee challenged this
exemption and attempted to claim the refund as property of the estate.25 The court noted that the
debtors would not have any right to cash unless they were entitled to a refund after their next tax
return was filed.26 The court stated that § 542 could not be used to broaden the trustee’s interest,
and therefore reasoned that the trustee’s interest in the refund would be limited by the same
contingencies that the debtors’ interest had been.27 As a result, the trustee would only be able to
compel turnover if part of the initial refund exceeded the debtors’ tax liability the following
year.28
In the Fourth Circuit, a debtor’s mere equitable interest in property that was repossessed
pre-petition, including a statutory right to redeem that property, is sufficient to allow a trustee to
compel turnover of that property.29 In In re Moffet, the Fourth Circuit stated that a debtor’s right
to redeem repossessed property was “unquestionably a ‘legal or equitable interest.’”30 The court
reasoned that because the debtor’s reorganization plan called for her to exercise her right of
redemption under Virginia’s version of the UCC, the creditor’s security interest was adequately
protected, and the repossessed vehicle was subject to the turnover provision of the Bankruptcy
Code.31 The court conceded that the debtor did not plan to make a lump sum payment of her
outstanding debts on the vehicle, as Virginia’s UCC required, but it reasoned that § 1322(b)(2) of
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1157.
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Id. at 1157-58.
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Id. at 1159.
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See In re Moffett, 356 F.3d at 522 (4th Cir. 2004).
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Id.
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Id. at 523.
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the Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to modify claims of secured creditors, and because the plan
called for the exercise of the right to redeem, the vehicle was subject to turnover.32
Conversely, in the Eleventh Circuit, an estate’s statutory right to redeem repossessed
property is not enough to subject that property to a trustee’s power to turn over assets.33 In In re
Lewis, the debtor’s automobile was repossessed pre-petition, and, post-petition, he attempted to
compel the creditor to turn over the vehicle to the estate.34 The Eleventh Circuit determined that
the debtor’s statutory right to redeem his vehicle was property of the estate.35 But the Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that the “mere existence of the estate’s ability to redeem the automobile” did
not render the vehicle itself “property of the estate.”36 Instead, it held that to compel turnover of
the vehicle, the trustee would have to fulfill the statutory obligations of the right of redemption
as a debtor outside of bankruptcy would.37
CONCLUSION
A trustee in bankruptcy has broad powers to recover property of the estate under § 541
and § 542 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a bankruptcy
trustee to compel turnover, and the property subject to the turnover provision is delineated by the
“property of the estate” description in § 541(a). It is well-settled that barring an overriding
federal interest, property interests are defined by state law, so the applicable standards vary by
state when turnover is contested in bankruptcy. Despite the underlying principle that the
Bankruptcy Code was not intended to expand a debtor’s rights more than they exist at the
commencement of the case, some trustees still attempt to apply the turnover provisions liberally.
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Id.
See In re Lewis, 137 F.3d at 1285 (11th Cir. 1998).
34
Id. at 1281.
35
Id. at 1284.
36
Id.
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Id.
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And even providing for varying state property laws, the circuit courts have been inconsistent in
their applications of what property is subject to turnover, and have established differing
standards.
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